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ABSTRACT
In Western common sense, one speaks of there being five human senses, a 
claim apparently challenged by the biological and psychological sciences. Part of 
this challenge comes in the form of claiming the existence of additional senses 
(proprioception, pain, a human pheromone sense). Part of the challenge comes 
from positing multiple senses where common sense only speaks of one, such as 
with the fractionation of “touch” into pressure and temperature senses. One con-
ceptual difficulty in thinking about the number and division of senses is that it's 
not clear whether the different senses constitute natural kinds and, if not, what 
kind of kind they are. Should we favor antirealism with respect to the senses, 
akin to the arguments of some concerning the nature of species or race? I will 
argue that this first problem is compounded by another: that we ought to be plu-
ralists with respect to the senses—what is meant by the term “sense” varies from 
context to context, varying even between scientific contexts.
I. Introduction
In a recent paper, “The senses as psychological kinds,” Matthew Nudds 
(2011) observes and asks, “We see, hear, touch, smell, and taste things. In dis-
tinguishing determinate ways of perceiving things, what are we distinguishing be-
tween? What, in other words, is a sense modality” (311)? He goes on to note that 
there are many differences to be found between the senses, but asks, “...which, if 
any, of these differences are those that really matter?” (311, my emphasis). This 
1
is all just a way of asking a question about the metaphysical nature of the 
senses.
At first glance, it might seem that the difference between the senses would 
be a paradigm case of a difference in kind. On many different commonsense cri-
teria, seeing and hearing, say, are fundamentally different: They are carried out 
by different organs (eyes and ears, respectively). They bring us information about 
very different aspects of the world (colors and pitches). They involve the trans-
duction of different kinds of energy (electromagnetic and mechanical). Further, 
the experiences of one are not easily confused with those of the other. The dif-
ferences here would seem to be brute; a starting point for further analysis, not 
something open for much analysis itself. Apparently, seeing and hearing are just 
different.
In exploring these questions, Nudds considers the possibility that the 
senses are natural kinds—more precisely: “psychological kinds”—and are differ-
entiated in virtue of the different perceptual (psychological) mechanisms that op-
erate in the cases of the differing senses. However, although he sees such an 
account as having merit, he is not ultimately willing to bet on it.1 Instead, he pro-
poses that, 
...we could accept that in distinguishing different perceptions 
we are distinguishing them on the basis of how they were pro-
duced but give up on the idea that we can explain or give an 
account of the different ways that perceptions are produced 
that is independent of our practice of making the distinction. 
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1 Heʼs bothered that embracing such an account very likely will lead to the conclusion that the 
claim of common sense that humans have five (and exactly five) senses will be refuted. He finds 
this anathema and would prefer to avoid embracing such an eliminative materialist line of 
reasoning. As they say, one personʼs modus ponens is another personʼs modus tolens.
According to this approach, all visual perceptions are pro-
duced in the same way, and different ways of perceiving are 
individuated relative to a social practice of explaining and un-
derstanding behavior. On this view a sense modality is what 
might be called a social kind rather than a natural kind. Such 
an account may provide the best account of what a sense mo-
dality, as we commonly understand it, actually is. (338, em-
phasis in original)
Nudds is exploring an interesting issue: are the senses natural kinds? So-
cial kinds? My own reaction is that there are deeper issues here of which he is 
only scratching the surface. Nuddsʼ paper is one of the only ones I am familiar 
with that grapples with the question of what it is that we are presupposing in the 
first place when we talk of different senses.2 But even Nuddsʼ analysis is pretty 
slim on what the options are. For example, the paragraph I quote above (the final 
paragraph of the paper) is pretty much all he says on what a “social kind” is sup-
posed to be. Similarly, although the notion of “natural kinds” is central to the pa-
per, Nudds has almost nothing to say about what he takes that concept to mean; 
it is left largely unpacked. He draws no connection to the literature in philosophy 
of science over the metaphysical nature of natural vs. other kinds.
Further, we shouldnʼt take it for granted that the senses are, in fact, prop-
erly thought of as different kinds, whether paradigmatically or not. This oversight 
is important because, as I will show in this paper, it is far from clear what kind of 
kind the senses are, if they are any “kind” at all. Further, I will argue that what 
kind the senses are, in fact, varies from context to context. Treating “the senses” 
uniformly as kinds of a particular kind confuses rather than clarifies the situation.
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2 Nuddsʼ previous paper in 2004 is another.
II. Why does the question matter? 
Why does the question concerning the kind-hood of senses matter? So 
what? First, the questions here are centrally important to the metaphysics of 
mind. Ought we be realists with respect to the senses? Is there some fact of the 
matter about, say, how many senses species-typical humans have and what they 
are? If not, what should we say about the metaphysical standing of the individual 
senses? To get the idea of what might be at stake here, let me point to some re-
lated metaphysical questions.
Species: Species are clearly a central ontological category within the sci-
ence of biology—it is no accident that Darwinʼs book was entitled On the Origin 
of Species. It is important, therefore, to understand the metaphysical nature of 
this central concept, and this in turn is a vexed issue in both philosophy of biol-
ogy as well as biology itself. Recently, much ink has been spilled over whether 
we ought to be realists with respect to species, as well as the closely related 
question of what is the nature of the species concept.3 Darwin can be understood 
as overthrowing the essentialist understanding of species that had reigned in bi-
ology at least since Aristotle. Given that species evolve, as Darwin showed us, 
then they cannot have the immutable, God-given essences non-evolutionary 
models proposed. These days, there are those, such as Hull (1978) and Ghiselin 
(1974), who argue that species are best thought of as spatiotemporally extended 
individuals. Others, such as Kitcher (1984; 1989), argue that species are sets, 
while others (e.g., Boyd (1999), Griffiths (1999)) argue that they are homeostatic 
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3 See Wilson (1999) for a collection of essays on these topics.
property clusters. Still others are one form or another of antirealists about spe-
cies, e.g., (Stanford 1995) and arguably even Darwin himself. All of this discus-
sion is made relevant, in part, because of the central role that the concept spe-
cies plays in the field. It seems only right that we know exactly what sort of thing 
weʼre talking about when biologists develop their theories.4
Race: Where species is centrally important to biology, race is clearly an 
important social category, for better or for worse. For many of the same reasons 
as with species, it is crucial to understand the nature of the category of race. To 
what extent are racial categories “biologically real”? To what extent are they “so-
cially constructed”? Again, this is a topic of ongoing controversy and discussion. 
As with species, for centuries race was conceived in essentialist terms, a view K. 
Anthony Appiah (1996) calls “racialism”. Appiah rejects the biological reality of 
races, arguing instead that race categories are best thought of as identities that 
individuals chose to take on or which are culturally imposed on them. Others, 
such as Kitcher (1999) and Andreasen (2005), argue that racial categories do re-
flect biological realities, but nonetheless argue that such realities cannot support 
the kinds of discrimination that have historically been associated with them.5
I would like to propose that an understanding of the metaphysics of the 
senses shares some of the same features that make understanding species and 
race important. Parallel with the concept of species, the sensory modalities are 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 5 of 31
4 A parallel discussion exists in biology and philosophy of biology over the metaphysics of the 
concept gene. As with the debate over the nature and reality of species, there is also debate over 
whether genes exist and, if so, what is their metaphysical nature, cf. (Beurton, Falk et al. 2000; 
Moss 2003; Fox Keller and Harel 2007).
5 I could have spelled out much the same point about gender categories as I do about race here.
centrally important categories to any study of perception. Pick up any number of 
books about perception, say in sensory psychology or neuroscience or sensory 
anthropology, and you will find discussions of individual senses. It is not uncom-
mon to find books on perception broken up into chapters, each focussing on a 
different sensory modality. Further, this division often is presented with little or no 
discussion of what grounds or justifies such a division. Such a division is taken 
literally for granted.
That lack of explicit justification for the division of perception into the cate-
gories of vision, audition, smell, etc. derives from the trait that the concept of 
sensory modalities shares with race (and gender): its ubiquity as a human cate-
gory. While there is some disagreement over the specific senses posited,6 the 
practice of dividing up the senses is apparently universal. As anthropologist Kath-
ryn Linn Geurts (2002) puts it, “...a cultureʼs sensory order is one of the first and 
most basic elements of making ourselves human. I define sensory order (or sen-
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6 For example, the Anlo-Ewe of Western Africa count a balance sense among the basic senses 
(see (Geurts 2002)). As sensory anthropologists Howes & Classen (1991) put it, 
Other cultures do not necessarily divide the sensorium as we do. The 
Hausa recognize two senses [citing Ritchie];  “the Javanese have five 
senses (seeing, hearing, talking, smelling and feeling), which do not coin-
cide exactly with our five” [citing Dundes]. In short, there may be any num-
ber of “senses,” including what we would classify as extrasensory percep-
tion—the “sixth sense.” According to the Peruvian curer interviewed by 
Douglas Sharon in Wizard of the Four Winds, for example, a sixth clairvoy-
ant sense opens up when all five other senses have been stimulated 
through the use of hallucinogens and other ritual elements.... Eduardo, the 
curer, describes this sixth sense as 'a ʻvisionʼ much more remote... in the 
sense that one can look at things that go beyond the ordinary or that have 
happened in the past or can happen in the future.” (257-8)
Oddly, Nudds cites the book that this passage was taken from (Howes 1991) in support of his 
pronouncement that, “It is possible that some cultures distinguish fewer than five senses (by 
grouping together two senses we distinguish), but I have not been able to find a description of 
any culture that distinguishes more than five senses” (311). 
sorium) as a pattern of relative importance and differential elaboration of the 
various senses, through which children learn to perceive and to experience the 
world and in which pattern they develop their abilities” (5, emphases in original). 
In other words, Geurts is observing that across human culture, sensory organiza-
tion is one of the basic ways in which we enculturate our children and teach them 
who they are and how we all, as humans, interact with our world. Even if sensory 
categories do not have the powerful social implications that race and gender 
categories do, there is a value to studying other deeply held conceptual 
schemes, even if they do not lead to prejudice and injustice.7
In sum, the division of perception into different senses is centrally impor-
tant to the study of perception and such a division is a ubiquitous and central 
human practice. Given this, it would behoove us to understand what kind of divi-
sion this talk of the senses involves.
Further, if the discussion and arguments I present in this paper are cor-
rect, we (both we, the folk, and we, the investigators of sense) may be more con-
fused about the nature of the senses and what kind of kind they are. If identifying 
(and, better, clearing up) confusion is a virtue, then I strive for that here.
III. Kinds of Kind
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7 Iʼm not convinced that sensory categories are as “innocent” as this implies. One need only look 
at social attitudes of “neurotypicals” towards those who are blind, deaf, etc. to see that there are 
likely to be important issues of social concern here. There is a growing body of literature in 
“disability studies” that is relevant to this point. I only wish to argue that even if sensory categories 
are innocent of such implications, they are nonetheless of interest relative to similarly entrenched 
categories with more apparent social implications. If they are not so innocent, then so much the 
better for my point here.
What are the possible answers to the question “what kinds of kind are the 
senses?” Here are a couple of possibilities:8
a) Senses as natural kinds: Some division of the senses (leaving open 
what that division is) constitute a set of natural or scientific kinds. That is, the 
division of perception into a number of senses is something that is discovered 
about the nature of the universe, not invented by humans; it is some kind of 
mind-independent metaphysical division of the universe. As Bird & Tobin 
(2010) put it: “To say that a kind is natural is to say that it corresponds to a 
grouping or ordering that does not depend on humans. We tend to assume 
that science is successful in revealing these kinds; it is a corollary of scientific 
realism that when all goes well the classifications and taxonomies employed 
by science correspond to the real kinds in nature. The existence of these real 
and independent kinds of things is held to justify our scientific inferences and 
practices” (emphasis in original). Therefore, this reading would say that the 
senses are kinds analogous to the way in which different chemical elements 
or, perhaps, fundamental subatomic particles are kinds. At one point, species 
were taken to be a paradigm case of natural kinds, but as noted earlier, Dar-
win upended that account.9 Iʼll return to the senses as natural kinds in the final 
section.
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8 I do not want to claim that this list is exhaustive. I'm not even sure the options I present are 
mutually exclusive. 
9  Hacking (1991) offers a nice overview of the history of this term, tracing its origin back to J. S. 
Mill and John Venn in the late nineteenth century, although they were only giving a modern label 
to a concept with roots going back to at least Aristotle.
b) Senses as phenomenal kinds: In an oral response to an earlier paper of 
mine, Tom Polger once said, “Much of the bad press over qualia is well-
deserved; but if there is one place experiential qualities have a safe home, I 
wouldʼve thought it would be with the sense modalities.” He is not alone in his 
intuition; the natural place to talk about the phenomenal qualities of con-
sciousness is the perceptual realm. Philosophers of mind like to speak of the 
sharp pain of a papercut, the tanginess of a lemon, the deep, velvety red of a 
rose.10 The division of the senses into kinds could be the division of conscious 
perceptual experiences into different categories based on how it feels to expe-
rience them. This will be the topic of §V, below.
c) Senses as social kinds: While the senses clearly can be divided (we do 
so and have done so apparently since prior to the invention of written culture), 
such a division is conventional. Humans divide up the senses in response to 
cultural conditions. On this account, the senses are kinds analogous to the 
way that nonverbal gestures can be individuated. For example, in some Arabic 
cultures, sitting in such a way as to show the soles of one's feet to another is 
an offensive gesture, whereas Western Europeans might not even recognize 
sitting in this way as any kind of “gesture” at all. As noted above, this is Nuddsʼ 
final position on the question and Iʼll return to this option at the end of §V, con-
cerning phenomenal kinds, below.
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10 Although, as I describe in (Keeley 2009a), the strong association of qualia with sensory 
qualities is a mid-20th-century shift from earlier philosophical practice. This prior use reserved the 
term for nonsensory or multisensory phenomenal qualities, such as the feeling of effort or the 
quale of spaciousness. 
d) Senses as functional kinds: Functional kinds are defined by the causal 
role they play in some larger system, rather than by any constitutive or phe-
nomenal property that they might have. On a functional account, the senses 
are kinds analogous to the way that the different organ systems of the mam-
malian body can be individuated into systems: the respiratory system, the di-
gestive system, or the circulatory system, or perhaps better: the way that dif-
ferent parts of any one of those systems can be divided up. It is important, 
however, to make sure that this use of function is firmly connected to the 
related-but-different concept of function as it is used in evolutionary theory. 
This is the topic of the next section, §IV.
IV. Senses as functional kinds
A functionalist is one who claims that psychological states are neither 
physical nor physiological states of a system but rather that they are Functional 
states, defined by their role within a causal description of some sort. Putnam 
(1967) introduces the notion of a functional Description by proposing that psycho-
logical systems can be described in relation to a Turing machine framework:
A Description of S where S is a system, is any true statement 
to the effect that S possesses distinct states S1, S2, . . . Sn 
which are related to one another and to the motor outputs and 
sensory inputs by the transition probabilities given in such-
and-such a Machine Table. The Machine Table mentioned in 
the Description will then be called the Functional Organization 
of S relative to that Description, and the Si such that S is in 
state Si at a given time will be called the Total State of S (at 
that time) relative to that Description. (226)
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Cummins (1975) generalizes Putnamʼs account and reframes it in more 
general terms: “a function-ascribing statement explains the presence of the func-
tionally characterized item i in a system s by pointing out that i is present in s be-
cause it has certain effects on s” (741). He notes that we find these kinds of ex-
planatory strategies all the time in the description of artifacts, as when engineers 
produce schematic flowchart diagrams with symbols representing the different 
items; items described in terms of the functions they carry out (resistors, capaci-
tors, etc.) (760). Cummins goes on to discuss how,
Functional analysis in biology is essentially similar. The bio-
logically significant capacities of an entire organism are ex-
plained by analyzing the organism into a number of “sys-
tems”—the circulatory system, the digestive system, the nerv-
ous system, etc.,—each of which has its characteristic capaci-
ties. These capacities are in turn analyzed into capacities of 
component organs and structures. Ideally, this strategy is 
pressed until pure physiology takes over, i.e., until the analyz-
ing capacities are amenable to the subsumption strategy. We 
can easily imagine biologists expressing their analyses in a 
form analogous to the schematic diagrams of electrical engi-
neering, with special symbols for pumps, pipes, filters, and so 
on. Indeed, analyses of even simple cognitive capacities are 
typically expressed in flow charts or programs, forms designed 
specifically to represent analyses of information processing 
capacities generally. (760-761)
So, in the case of the senses, we can use an approach like this to under-
stand the nature of perception.  As Cummins just described, after identifying the 
nervous system as one of the components of an organism, it is then further ana-
lyzed into its components, one of which would likely be a sensory system, along-
side the motor system, as well as any number of systems situated between the 
“input” and “output” of the organism.  Further, this sensory system would be fur-
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 11 of 31
ther analyzed into the different subsystems that we commonly think of as the dif-
ferent senses: a visual system, an auditory system, and so on. This is a not un-
reasonable way of capturing what some sensory scientists do in neuroscience 
and psychology. 
It is important to keep in mind that these functional kinds are also func-
tions in the sense of evolutionary biology; they are Darwinian functions that ex-
plain why organisms have evolved to have the traits that they have.11 This char-
acteristic of functional kinds is important for re-identifying those kinds in different 
evolutionary lineages, such as when biologists speak of the convergent evolution 
of vision in different taxa: Both vertebrates (e.g., humans) and mollusks (e.g., oc-
topus) have evolved vision and possess eyes, but biologists believe that the 
most-recent common ancestor of vertebrates and mollusks had neither eyes nor 
vision. Given that humans and octopus eyes are physically different (as a result 
of their unrelated phylogenetic origins) what makes these structures both “eyes” 
is that they share an identifiable evolutionary function. 
This is the sort of approach that Nudds (2011) has in mind when he 
speaks of “psychological kinds”12:
My suggestion, then, is that the most plausible explanation of 
the distinction we make between senses is that we distinguish 
perceptions into perceptions of different senses on the basis of 
a reflective understanding of how those perceptions were pro-
duced. In doing so, we are distinguishing between perceptions 
produced by different kinds of sensory mechanism, and so our 
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11 This is a point stressed by philosophers of biology, e.g., (Sober 1985; Kitcher 2003).
12 Although, Nuddsʼ terminology doesnʼt map cleanly onto mine. At times he uses the term 
“psychological kind” to refer to what Iʼm calling a “phenomenal kind,” e.g., p. 336.  Part of the 
confusion is that he sometimes talks of the putative function of the senses as producing certain 
phenomenal perceptual states.
concepts of the senses must be concepts of different kinds of 
sensory mechanism. This provides an answer to the question 
of what constitutes a sense modality. A sense modality just is a 
kind of sensory mechanism, and all instances of, say, seeing 
something are instances of seeing that thing in virtue of their 
having been produced by a single kind of sensory mecha-
nism—the sensory mechanism of vision. (314, emphasis in 
original)
Most of Nuddsʼ paper is an exploration and eventual rejection of this ap-
proach. In particular, he understands this approach to require one-to-one map-
pings of sensory mechanisms onto the functional kinds, a requirement that he 
argues that contemporary perceptual psychology shows to be violated. Vision 
and audition (which he considers in some detail) have been shown to involve the 
operation of multiple perceptual mechanisms, such as the “dual stream hypothe-
sis” of Milner and Goodale (1995; Goodale 1998), according to which there are 
separate pathways underlying the visual identification of objects (the “what” 
pathway) and the guidance of motor action (the “where” pathway). On the basis 
of this and the presence of similar features found by sensory psychologists in the 
other senses, Nudds concludes:
That, I think, undermines the suggestion that the senses are 
natural kinds—it undermines the suggestion that the distinc-
tion we actually make between different senses tracks a natu-
ral distinction between kinds of psychological processes, and it 
shows that we cannot appeal to the psychological processes 
involved in perception to answer the question with which I be-
gan: What do all instances of seeing have in common in virtue 
of which they are instances of seeing? Whatever it is they 
have in common—whatever it is that makes a visual percep-
tion a visual perception—it is not that they are produced by a 
single kind of sensory mechanism. (335, emphases in original)
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A few things should be noted here, in response. First, on Nuddsʼ reading, 
functional kinds just are a subspecies of natural kind.13 This makes sense if we 
take one of the key features of natural kinds to be that they are human-
independent categories. The identification of sensory mechanisms within a func-
tionalist frameworks seem appropriately mind-independent here; they are scien-
tific discoveries, not inventions (if we are to adopt any reasonably realist account 
of science). 
But, second, notice that his functionalist account is one that doesnʼt make 
much reference to the evolutionary aspects of function. As mentioned earlier, at-
tributions of evolutionary function are useful in heading off the dead-end that 
Nudds finds himself in his deployment of sensory mechanisms. The sensory 
mechanisms of the octopus and human eyes are markedly different, but we can 
identify them both as functionally equivalent because of the role each organ 
plays in the lives/reproductive fitness of the organisms which possess them. As 
Kitcher (2003) puts it, “When we attribute functions to entities that make a causal 
contribution to complexes, there is, I suggest, always a source of design in the 
background. The constituents of a machine have functions because the machine, 
as a whole, is explicitly intended to do something. Similarly with organisms” 
(169).  That background evolutionary context allows us to group together sensory 
Keeley, “Senses as Kinds”    — Draft: Do not cite                                        Page 14 of 31
13 He also briefly discusses and rejects a few other ways that the senses could be natural kinds. 
They might be anatomical kinds; that is, we might be able to differentiate the kinds by reference 
to the anatomical features of their respective sense organs (335-336). This view ultimately 
founders, he believes, on his claim that any anatomical account must ultimately presuppose a 
functionalist individuation of sensory mechanisms, an account that he has already shown to be 
wanting. He also discusses the option that I here describe as phenomenal kinds. In the end, he 
finds all these accounts wanting and is left with the remaining option that we count the senses we 
do because it is our social practice to do so, and nothing more. 
mechanisms that too narrow a focus on the proximate causal analysis of mecha-
nisms would classify as separate.
So, returning to the earlier point, if the senses are to be natural kinds in 
virtue of being functional kinds, what Nudds has shown us is that we cannot un-
derstand functional analysis here solely in proximate, psychological mechanism 
terms; instead, we need to understand functions more broadly in ultimate evolu-
tionary terms, understanding not just the operation of the mechanisms, but un-
derstanding the role those mechanisms play in the evolutionary history of the or-
ganisms that possess them.14
V. Senses as phenomenal kinds.
One complication in all this questioning of the kind-hood of the senses is 
that the senses are not just biological categories, traits possessed by biological 
organisms. They are also phenomenal categories; that is, they are categories of 
conscious experience. As such, they lay at the foundation of a very deep way of 
dividing things up into kinds. They are qualities in the way of speaking where one 
says, “These two things differ not only quantitatively, but qualitatively.” Or, “What 
we have here is not a difference in degree but a difference in kind.” 
This connection between this general sense of qualities and the elements 
of phenomenal experience is borne out by the importance of the concept quale/
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14 Two final notes to place this discussion in a larger context.  First, I discuss the importance of 
such evolutionary (and also ontogenetic/developmental) considerations as the importance of 
understanding the “dedication” of putative sensory systems to particular modalities, see (Keeley 
2002: 17-19), for a critical reply, see (Matthen 2012). Second, I should also note that there is 
some controversy over whether we should be realists with respect to evolutionary function. There 
are those, such as Dan Dennett, who reject realism about functional attributions. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, I side with realists such as Kitcher. See the debate referenced in (Keeley 1999).
qualia to 20th century philosophy of mind. On the one hand, the concept of qualia 
is that they are, in some sense, the basic building blocks of phenomenal experi-
ence. Any given conscious experience will have a number of different qualia that 
make it up, including qualia of color and smell, as well as emotional tone, feelings 
of recognition or novelty, and the like. On the other hand, the term itself derives 
from talk of kinds. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “quale” derives 
from the Latin qualis (“Of what kind”) and the term means “The quality of a thing; 
a thing having certain qualities.”  So, quale stands as an important link between 
the idea of sensory qualities and the idea of kinds.15
There is some sense to saying that there is some kind of fundamental 
qualitative distinction between the experiences of different senses.16 It is com-
mon to suppose that visual experiences are just qualitatively different from audi-
tory experiences. This line of thought naturally gives rise to an understanding of 
the senses as natural kinds in the sense that the difference between the senses 
here is given to us, not invented by us. Metaphysically, the difference between 
the senses is as given as the difference between the chemical elements. 
However, this account is problematic in a number of different ways. The 
crucial element of the account is that the basis for the difference between the 
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15 I have previously discussed the early philosophical history of the concept “qualia” before. See 
Keeley (2009a).
16 As Nudds (2011) observes, “Many philosophers suppose that there is an obvious answer to 
[the question of what differentiates the senses]. In order to perceive something one must have an 
experience of it. Seeing something requires having a visual experience of it, hearing something 
requires having an auditory experience of it, and so on. The different kinds of experiences 
involved in perceiving are what constitute perceiving with different senses. We see something just 
in case we perceive it in virtue of having a visual experience of it; hear something just in case we 
perceive it in virtue of having an auditory experience of it, and so on. To answer the question in 
this way is to give an experiential account of the senses.” (312, emphases in original).
senses is given in experience. One can challenge the claim that a relevant datum 
is given.17
The issues here relate to concerns over the transparency of perception. In 
debates over the nature of phenomenal experience, there are those who argue 
that we can never fix on the nature of phenomenal experience per se, but that 
instead we always peer through the experience to that which is represented by 
the experience. As Block (2007) puts it, the idea of transparency is that, “...when I 
try to introspect my experience of the redness of a tomato, I only succeed in at-
tending to the color of the tomato itself, and not to any mental feature of the ex-
perience. The representationalist thinks that we can exploit this intuition to ex-
plain phenomenal character in non-phenomenal terms” (611).
 The experience itself is diaphanous, transparent. Or, so the transparency 
thesis holds. This alleged transparency of experience is taken by proponents of a 
representationalist account of consciousness as a “powerful motivation” for their 
view (Tye 2000: 45). According to strong versions of representationalism, the 
phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by the representational con-
tent of experience; there is nothing more to phenomenal experience beyond what 
is represented. This view is bolstered by the transparency thesis, in that if all we 
ever experience is perception is that which is represented in perception—be-
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17 One could also, of course, challenge the concept of givenness itself; one could argue that 
nothing is ever given in experience capabable of doing any interesting epistemic work. While I am 
sympathetic to such a line of argument, here I will restrict myself to the narrowerer claim that in 
this specific case, nothing is given in experience that can act as the basis of a way to distinguish 
the senses into kinds.
cause we “see through” the experience to the represented properties—then there 
is nothing “left over” requiring a non-representational explanation.18 
My concern here is not debates concerning representationalist theories of 
consciousness.19 Currently, there are philosophers of mind on both sides and the 
issue seems to be unsettled. Rather, the issue points to two significantly different 
ways in which the senses as phenomenal kinds might work. If one rejects repre-
sentationalism, then one would hold that the experiences of different senses will 
differ intrinsically; that there is some “vision-y” character that all visual experi-
ences share and which is experienced simply as different from the experiences 
of other senses.20 On this account, visual experiences would wear their visual 
status on their sleeves, as it were. Put another way, the sensory modality of a 
perceptual experience would be given in that experience.  This brute phenome-
nal difference between experiences would be the grounds for differentiating dif-
ferent phenomenal kinds; this would ground a literal qualitative distinction of 
kinds here.  Letʼs call this view a Nonrepresentationalist Phenomenal Kinds view.
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18 I am greatly compressing a complicated argument here. See (Tye 2000: Ch. 3) for more. For 
some reasons to demur, see (Kind 2003).
19 As an aside, in his 2011 paper, Nudds explicitly endorses the transparency thesis and denies 
that there is anything intrinsic to perceptual experiences themselves that can be used to 
differentiate the senses (cf., 312ff). In a footnote, he identifies this as a “a fundamental 
disagreement” with what I say in the opening sentences of my 2002 paper. For the record, I was 
taking no substantive stand in those introductory sentences. Indeed, I saw myself to be setting up  
the phenomenon or problem, much as Nudds himself does in the first paragraph of his own 
recent paper (which I quoted above on page 1).
20 Perhaps because I havenʼt read enough on the non-representationalist side of this debate, Iʼm 
unaware of somebody making precisely this line of argument (specifically that the sensory 
modality of a perceptual experience is given in experience). Please let me know if you know 
somebody who makes this specific claim.
Representationalists (because of the transparency thesis) deny the exis-
tence of any such intrinsic character of experience beyond what is perceptually 
represented.  Indeed, talk of some “vision-y” character of experience is precisely 
the kind of thing they are wont to deny. However, this is not to say that they do 
not talk of phenomenal kinds—their talk of perception is rife with such talk; they 
just ground it differently.  For example, consider the following passages from 
arch-representationalist Michael Tye.  He begins by reminding us of the repre-
sentationalist view, taking vision as his example:
Visual phenomenal qualities or visual qualia are supposedly 
qualities of which the subjects of visual experiences are di-
rectly aware via introspection. Tradition has it that these quali-
ties are qualities of the experiences. Tradition is wrong. There 
are no such qualities of experiences. If we stipulate that some-
thing is a visual phenomenal quality or a quale only if it is a 
directly accessible quality of experience, then there are no 
visual phenomenal qualities or qualia. Still there are qualities 
of which the subjects of visual experiences are directly aware 
via introspection. They are qualities of external surfaces (and 
volumes and films), if they are qualities of anything. These 
qualities, by entering into the appropriate representational con-
tents of visual experiences, contribute to the phenomenal 
character of the experiences. Thus, they may reasonably be 
called “phenomenal qualities” in a less restrictive sense of the 
term. (2000: 49, emphasis in original)
Tye then goes on to point out that such an analysis is not restricted to vi-
sion, but instead extends easily to the rest of perception:
All of the above points generalize to other perceptual modali-
ties. For example, we hear things by hearing the sounds they 
emit. These sounds are publicly accessible. They can be re-
corded. Similarly, we smell things by smelling the odors they 
give off. They, too, are publicly accessible. You and I can both 
smell the foul odor of the rotting garbage. Odors, like sounds, 
move through physical space. We taste things by tasting their 
tastes. One and the same taste can be tasted by different 
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people. Some tastes are bitter, others are sweet. When we in-
trospect our experiences of hearing, smelling, and tasting, the 
qualities of which we are directly aware are qualities we expe-
rience as being qualities of sounds, odors, and tastes. It 
seems very natural to suppose that among these qualities are 
the following: pitch, tone, loudness, pungency, muskiness, 
sweetness, saltiness, sourness. But this supposition is not 
needed by the argument. The crucial point again is that the 
qualities of which we are directly aware via introspec-
tion—whatever they turn out to be—are not qualities of the ex-
perience of hearing, smelling, and tasting. Rather, they are 
qualities of public surfaces, sounds, odors, tastes, and so 
forth, if they are qualities of anything at all (for, as before, the 
experiences may be hallucinatory). Change these qualiti-
es—the ones of which we can be directly aware via introspec-
tion—and, necessarily, the phenomenal character of the expe-
rience changes. Again, then, phenomenal character is best 
taken to be a matter of representational content. And again, 
there are no phenomenal qualities, conceived of as qualities of 
experiences. (2000: 49-50, emphasis in original)21
In these passages, it is clear that Tye is distinguishing between the phe-
nomenal qualities of the different senses. The entire discussion is organized in 
relation to the different senses. But what exactly grounds these distinctions? The 
answer is revealed when Tye responds to counter examples raised by Ned Block 
(1995; 1996) and others that there are cross-modal cases where we have differ-
ent phenomenal experiences despite those experiences having the same repre-
sentational content, as when we come to know that there is a round surface in 
front of me either by seeing that surface or by reaching out and feeling it with my 
hands. In this case, there is a clear phenomenal difference (seeing vs. tactually 
feeling a surface) despite the same representational content (that there is a 
round surface 15 centimeters in front of my nose). 
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phenomenal experience, including bodily sensations (including pain), moods and emotions.
In responding to this kind of counter example, Tye has to lay out how a 
representationalist distinguishes phenomenal kinds of one modality (visual) from 
another (tactile):
One obvious immediate reply the representationalist can make 
is that in seeing the shape, one has an experience as of color. 
But color isnʼt represented in the content of the haptic experi-
ence. Conversely, temperature is represented in haptic expe-
rience but not in the visual one (or at least not to the same ex-
tent). Likewise, there is much more detailed representation of 
degree of solidity in the haptic experience. Another represen-
tational difference pertains to the location of the shape. In vi-
sion, the shape is automatically represented as having a cer-
tain two-dimensional location relative to the eyes. It is also 
normally represented as being at a certain distance away from 
the body. In the haptic case, however, shape is represented 
via more basic touch and pressure representations of contours 
derived from sensors in the skin.22 Here the shape is repre-
sented as belonging to a surface with which one is in bodily 
contact. Moreover (and relatedly) in the haptic experience, 
there is no representation of the shape's two-dimensional lo-
cation relative to the eyes. Finally, and very importantly, in the 
visual case, there is representation not only of viewer-
independent shape but also of viewer-relative shape (e.g., be-
ing elliptical from here). The latter property, of course, is not 
represented in the haptic experience.23 (95)
 This then allows us to spell out what I will call the Representationalist 
Phenomenal Kinds view. What Tye seems to be proposing here is that we can 
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22 I have no idea why Tye thinks these are “more basic” or even what this means in this context.
23 As with the previous footnote, I also find this last point somewhat baffling. In claiming that the 
haptic sense does not represent the body-relative position of the surface, Tye must be 
distinguishing the contents of proprioception from those of pressure sensation. That is, if I feel my 
fingers pressed up against a surface 15cm in front of my face, the pressure sensors themselves 
do not give rise to that representation of distance; that distance representation is a product of the 
simultaneous proprioceptive sense of the positions of my limbs at that moment (elbow and wrist 
bent just this much, etc.)  Fine, but it is odd to segregate pressure and proprioception sensation 
while simultaneously lumping pressure and temperature sensation together as a single sense of 
“touch” despite the fact that these are carried out by different peripheral sensory systems in the 
skin. At least, without further discussion, these distinctions seem arbitrary, especially given that 
the sense of touch is famously the most problematic for a proper objects account of the senses 
(see (Keeley 2002; 2009b)).
distinguish between the different senses on the basis of what Aristotle called the 
“proper” or “special objects” of perception.24 The proper object(s) of a sense are 
those qualities that only that sense can elicit; for example, we only come to expe-
rience color by vision, only come to experience temperature through touch. This 
exclusive connection between each sensory modality and some particular proper 
object experienced as a result of its action—color for vision, temperature/
pressure for touch, odor for smell, flavors for taste, pitch/loudness for hear-
ing—gives us a representationalist means for dividing up the senses into distinct 
categories. And circling back to the points made at the beginning of this section, 
pitch, flavor, color, etc. are paradigm examples of “qualities” at play when we talk 
about differences of quality vs. difference of quantity. The difference between a 
whisper and a nearby crash of thunder is a difference of quantity (of loudness) 
whereas the difference between a whisper and a nearby flash of lightning is a dif-
ference of quality.
 A phenomenal kinds account of the senses—in either the Representa-
tionalist or Nonrepresentationalist version—is interesting and has a degree of 
plausibility in the way that it matches up with our own perceptual experience. In 
the end, it may turn out to offer a coherent and empirically-adequate account of 
the division of the senses into kinds.  However, I have my doubts. 
First, I donʼt understand how such an account can make sense of senses 
that lack any phenomenal character, such as a putative “pheromone (or vomero-
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24 I discuss this Aristotlean approach at length in (Keeley 2002; 2009b).
nasal) sense” in humans.25 Some scientists report a phenomenon akin to the 
once-common philosophical example of “chicken sexing” whereby subjects can 
reliably make behavioral discriminations of vomeronasal stimuli, but these same 
subjects report no phenomenal differences in their experiences. They feel as 
though they are guessing. Proponents of phenomenal kinds can simply (and 
consistently) deny that this putative sense actually is a sense; indeed, they seem 
to be forced to. OK, but what of the senses of non-human animals; especially 
those where the presence of a vomeronsal sense is well established, and is stud-
ied alongside other senses? How exactly do we make the sense/nonsense dis-
tinction in nonhuman animals; that is, how do we tell when they are “guessing” or 
acting unconsciously?  Again, it would be consistent for believers in phenomenal 
kind accounts of the senses to deny that animals have senses, but that seems to 
be a more draconian move, to say the least.
A second problem for phenomenalist accounts is that recent work in sen-
sory psychology is increasingly undermining the empirical viability of the pro-
posed connection between senses and their unique qualities. In other words, sci-
entists are increasingly showing that, in practice, the phenomenal qualites of ex-
periences we have are the product of multiple senses, not just one. So, in the 
McGurk effect, the sound that you hear is a product of both what your ears hear 
and what your eyes see. Change (only) what the eyes see (in this case, what an 
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25 I raise this example in (Keeley 2002: 23ff). Noë (2004: 107-111) and I (Keeley 2009b: 231-238) 
have debated issues related to this. Although Noë explicitly attempts to avoid endorsing a 
phenomenalist account, I argue that he nonetheless ends up running into the same problems that 
somebody such as Tye will need to overcome.
interlocutors lips look like) and your auditory experience changes.26 Similar re-
sults have been found for other sensory combinations: what you hear effects 
what things taste like, what you hear effects what things look like, etc.27 This is 
important for the representationalists because, such cases threaten to show that 
the representational feature they need to be uniquely connected to a given sense 
(if it is to play the role of identifying the phenomenal kind) is not, in fact, unique. 
For the nonrepresentationalist, these results from sensory psychology are 
threatening in a slightly different way, which brings me to my third concern with 
phenomenalist accounts of the senses. In arguing that the senses can be differ-
entiated into kinds by the presence of some given phenomenal quality, such ac-
counts ignore the potential theory-ladenness of introspection. What the theory-
ladenness of introspection means is that what we experience (and therefore what 
we can claim to introspect) is, in part, a function of the theoretical categories we 
bring to that introspection.28 If this is the case, these experienced qualities are 
not given, in that if we had different categories and a different understanding of 
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26 Of course, calling it an “auditory experience” begs the question here. To the extent that what 
people report hearing is a product of what effected their eyes, then on the representationalist 
account, the experience would not be “auditory” but rather some mixture of the two. If there are 
no unique features represented by individual senses, then the representationalist account will be 
unable to differentiate perceptions into different sensory kinds. This is my point.
27 See (Calvert, Spence et al. 2004; Spence and Driver 2004) for more on multisensory 
perception. Also, Nudds (2011: 335) also discusses the importance of multisensory perception for 
accounts of the senses. 
28 In this way, the theory-ladenness of introspection is intended to parallel the thesis of the 
theory-ladenness of perception, familiar from discussions in the philosophy of science, see 
(Hanson 1958). The idea is that what one observes is, in part, a function of the theory one brings 
to an observation. For example, in a real sense, what a heliocentrist and a geocentrist observe 
when peering eastward at dawn is different and is a function of those theories. I take the notion of 
the theory-ladenness of introspection from (Churchland 1985), but he credits ideas found in 
(Feyerabend 1963).
how the action of our senses gives rise to our perceptual experiences, we expe-
rience perception differently. Further, as indicated by the anthropology of senses 
(see footnote 6 above), humans do, in fact, have different categories and differ-
ent understandings of the nature and number of senses. 
If the theory ladenness of introspection is true, then it would imply that, in 
essence, the senses as phenomenal kinds are, in fact, in part, a product of social 
categories. That is, phenomenal kinds would be, in part, reducible to social kinds, 
in that how one is raised and enculturated would provide one with the categories 
of sense and these, in turn, would play an important role in how one phenome-
nally experiences the process of perception. At least, the possibility of the theory 
ladenness of introspection poses some interesting lines of investigation for sen-
sory anthropologists—a rather young sub-discipline of anthropology—to explore. 
Does counting balance among oneʼs basic categories of the senses change how 
one reports experiencing perception?
However, these three worries are just that: worries. They involve more 
open questions to those that want to defend and explicate a phenomenalist ac-
count of the senses than refutations of this approach.  
IV. Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, I have considered a number of different ways of thinking of 
the senses as kinds. OK, but which way is the correct way? Ultimately, are the 
senses natural kinds? And, if so, specifically functional kinds? Phenomenal 
kinds? Social kinds? Some other notion of kinds?  My response is to resists the 
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implication of such questions by resisting the implication that there has to be a 
single answer to the question of what kinds of kind are the senses. I propose that 
we embrace a form of pluralism with respect to the senses.  To see why I say 
this, however, let me take a quick detour in what might seem to be the opposite 
direction: the notion that the senses are not any kind at all; that the application of 
“kind talk” to the senses is just a bit confused from the get go.
Consider the following explanation of what a natural kind is supposed to 
be, taken from the Concise Routledge encyclopedia of philosophy: “Objects be-
longing to a natural kind form a group of objects which have some theoretically 
important property in common. ... Natural kinds are contrasted with arbitrary 
groups of objects such as the contents of dustbins, or collections of jewels. The 
latter have no theoretically important property in common: They have no unifying 
feature” (Daly 2000: 612-613). Notice that this account of natural kinds has two 
important features. First, there is the collection of entities brought together under 
the natural kind description (“a group of objects”). Second, there is the property 
that so defines that collection (the “theoretically important property,” the “unifying 
feature”).   That is, when we normally speak of natural kinds, there are two com-
ponents, reflected in the term itself: There are the kinds (the collection of entities) 
sorted according to some property (in this case, a nonhuman, natural property. 
This, in contrast to, say, artificial kinds which is a collection of things delineated 
by some perhaps arbitrary, human property). 
Noticing this reveals that there is something deeply odd about much of the 
discussion I have engaged in above.  Unlike what is the case when considering 
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situations such as species, genes, races and genders, the sensory examples I 
have been discussing actually sound much more like the properties that define 
the kinds and not the kinds themselves. That is, when talking about the meta-
physical nature of vision as versus hearing, for example, that nature is closer to 
talk of the thing by which we define a collection of entities, not the entities them-
selves. Consider the senses as functional kinds: Vision is a function (a property) 
that allows one to class certain mollusks and vertebrates (a collection of entities) 
together into the same category. Even on the less evolutionary reading of func-
tions that Nudds discusses, a sense is identified with a particular perceptual 
mechanism; possessing that mechanism is something either organisms have or 
do not. It is a state that an entity can (or cannot) be in. Again, the sense is a 
property not an entity.  Or, consider the case of phenomenal kinds: Here it is 
even more explicit that what we are dealing with are properties (the possession 
of phenomenal qualities) instead of collections of entities.  In all of these discus-
sions, we have not been careful enough to distinguish the properties (e.g., having 
vision) from entities (e.g., the sighted). The latter are the “kinds”; the former are 
the properties that define the kinds.
Recognizing that senses are more properly thought of as the defining 
properties of groups of kinds rather than the kinds (as collections of entities) 
themselves in turn supports a kind of pluralism in relation to talk of the senses. It 
is a commonplace to identify a large number of properties possessed by any 
given entity and it is equally commonplace to cross-categorize the kind-groupings 
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into which we place a given entity depending on what properties one is attending 
to.
Further, as the Daly quotation above also stresses, the properties that are 
important in natural kinds are “theoretically important” properties. It is far from 
clear that there is only one theory—and, hence, only one set of theoretically im-
portant properties—in the study of the senses. I take it that my discussion of 
functional and phenomenal approaches to the senses demonstrates that. The 
concerns of psychophysicists and philosophers of perception concerned with the 
understanding phenomenal character of perceptual experience are different from 
neuroethologists, comparative biologists, and those interested in the evolution of 
sensory systems. This plurality of theoretical interest begets a plurality of kind-
talk. Add in the “folk” (who, according to previously cited anthropologists, do not 
universally share intuitions about the number and identity of the senses) and you 
get even more ways of speaking about the senses.29  
At the end of the day, I am not confident that I have answered my titleʼs 
question to anybodyʼs satisfaction. I plan to think about it further myself and look 
forward to your own thoughts.  But, I hope I have demonstrated the complexity of 
the issues involved and will spur you to come up with your own answer.
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29 As Haddock and Dupré (2006) put it in their own encyclopedia entry on “Natural Kinds”, “This 
possibility of diverging intentions suggests that one kind term might be a natural-kind term among 
a group of scientists (given how they use it) and a functional-kind term among a group of lay 
persons (given how they use it)” (505). (In their terminology, a “functional kind” is what Iʼve been 
calling a “social kind” here.)
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